Northern Illinois University

Huskie Commons
Honors Capstones

Undergraduate Research & Artistry

1-1-2011

Courting the Iron Horse: How the United States Exacted Limited
Controls Over the Railroads in the Second World War
Carl Nieman

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/studentengagementhonorscapstones

Recommended Citation
Nieman, Carl, "Courting the Iron Horse: How the United States Exacted Limited Controls Over the
Railroads in the Second World War" (2011). Honors Capstones. 346.
https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/studentengagement-honorscapstones/346

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Research & Artistry at
Huskie Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Capstones by an authorized administrator of
Huskie Commons. For more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

University Honors Program
Capstone Approval Page

Capstone Title: (print or type):

Student Name (print or type):

Faculty Supervisor (print or type):

Faculty Approval Signature:

Department of (print or type):

Date of Approval (print or type):

l

HONORS THESIS ABSTRACT
THESIS SUBMISSION FORM

ADVISOR:

,4.arovt

DISCIPLINE:

Po g-I e.'l"\.2 V1

Hi5+V'({

PAGE LENGTH:

4d

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

6

ILLUSTRATED:

ADVISOR'S DEPT:

YEAR:

2Q I (

J Jz.

PUBLISHED (YES OR NO):

(\0

LIST PUBLICATION:

COPIES AVAILABLE (HARD COPY, MICROFILM, DISKETTE):

ABSTRACT (100 - 200 WORDS):

I

Honors Thesis Abstract
This thesis explores the extent of US Government control over the railroads during the
Second World War. The purpose of this project is to discover how much government regulation
there was regarding the railroads and how intrusive it was. This is achieved by looking over
government documents between 1930 and 1950. These documents were reviewed and were
assessed on how intrusive they were or were not and also the period in which they were wrote,
during the war or before or after, was also taken into account. The findings of this thesis were
that the US Government did increase its control over the railroads during the war but nowhere
near as much as it had taken control of the railroads during World War I. The thesis also found
that the government quickly handed the control it had taken back to the railroads after the war
was over. This thesis is significant because the topic of government regulation and how much or
how little is necessary is still very relevant today.
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The Second World War was a time when Americans answered the call to duty and
American industry stepped up to take on the gargantuan task of producing and moving the
Arsenal of Democracy to where it was needed most. Trucks, tanks, cars, halftracks, planes,
submarines and ships of a variety of sizes and purposes were produced in vast numbers as part of
the war effort. In Europe Hitler's armies marched against the Soviet Union and England after
securing the rest of the continent. In Asia, the Japanese moved against China and a number of
European colonial holdings. American weapons and war machines helped to supply the besieged
Allied forces in both theaters before America's official entry and after, easing the stress on the
wartime industries of the Allied powers. In order to construct the tanks, planes, and ships needed
to fight the war, vast amounts of material needed to be moved. Coal, rubber, oil, iron ore,
precious and rare earth metals all needed to be moved in herculean amounts to feed the leviathan
that was the munitions production industry. Then the weapons often needed to be shipped
themselves to ports or airbases where they would be moved to their final destinations.

The

easiest way to move so much raw material and finished product was via the steel arteries of
America's railways. During the war, the US government played the vital role of coordinating the
efforts of the many American railroads into one cohesive operation.
The role that the US government played With regards to railroads during World War II
was not that of a supreme administrator which directly controlled all aspects of the railroads for
the duration of the conflict, but instead it was that of coordinator and vigilant advisor. The US
government was less interested in the details of how the railroads moved products and more
interested in that the railroads moved them in a timely and efficient manner. This style of
management and regulation developed out of the experience of American railroads under the
uncharacteristically

controlling bureaucracy that was developed for the similar task of ensuring
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the cooperation of the railroads in the First World War. This first effort to control American
railroads in a time of war
This paper examines the Congressional records regarding rules and regulations applied to
railroads during World War II. The role that the US Government played with regards to
railroads during World War II was not that of a supreme administrator which directly controlled
all aspects of the railroads for the duration of the conflict but instead it was that of coordinator
and vigilant advisor. The US Government was less interested in the details of how the railroads
moved products and more interested in that the railroads moved them in a timely and efficient
manner. This style of management and regulation developed out of the experience of American
railroads under the uncharacteristically controlling bureaucracy that was developed for the
similar task of ensuring the cooperation of the railroads in the First World War. This first effort
to control American railroads in a time of war ended with a general consensus that the
government had intruded too far into the railroads operations. From my investigation of the
government documents, it appears that the government officials targeted specific categories that
they believed would best help to mobilize the war economy and did not take any efforts to
expand beyond these narrow categories.
The historiography available on this subject is somewhat limited, mostly due to the more
casual nature of many of the works on American railroads, but what work there is can be placed
into two large categories of American railroads in general and regulation of American railroads
and one smaller less developed category of American railroads in times of war. While there are
vast amounts of books dedicated to American railroads, the number of scholarly monographs and
papers are far fewer in number. Many of the books suffer from the problem mentioned before
that they are written by someone who is interested in the subject but not trained in the historical
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methods necessary to make an in-depth evaluation of the subject. There are, however, a number
of well written works that make critical assessments of the development of railroads in the
United States, how government regulation has affected the railroads, and how the railroads
preformed in the times of war. John F. Stover's American Railroads, originally published in
1961 with a revised edition in 1997 extending the range of its assessment to the middle to late
1980's, reflects the view of railroads as the engine that helped to propel the American economy,
the gateway to the west and as a vital part of the American tapestry both materially and in the
imagination of the country. Stover stresses that the railroads were instrumental in the
development of nation and points out that changes in America could be seen reflected in changes
in the nature of the railroads. Stover's work approves of level of coordination and collaboration
between the US Government and the American railroads. A counterpoint to this view is
presented by authors such as Patrick O'Brian, The New Economic History of the Railways
(1977). He stresses that railways, especially those in America, Great Britain, and Russia did not
foster growth as much as they are traditionally credited with and that traditional ways of
transportation such as waterways provided were more important to industrialization and
modernization in these countries. These views are quite controversial because of how they
directly contradict the fundamental assumptions that many prior historians took that railroads
played in integral and important part in development in the industrialized world. Both of these
two camps deal with the influence that railroads played on the development of America or at the
very least the perceived notion thereof. Those who believe that the railroads played a vital role
in the world's development are in the majority and are widely perceived as being the more
significant group.'

1

John F. Stover American Railroads, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997);
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The most important books that directly address the American railroads efforts in the
Second World War are John Westwood's Railways at War (1980) and S. Kipp Farrington's
Railroads at War (1944). Both of these works take a very positive view of the American
railroads cooperation with the US government during periods of war. This body of works
believes that the American railroads operated at their best efficiency when they were allowed to
remain in control of their industry. This conclusion is drawn in these works based on the
observations of the war immediately prior to it, World War I, where the US government seized
control of the railroads for the duration of the war and the railroads were felt to have been
misused, underutilized, and generally less efficient than they could have been in a time of war
had they remained separate from the federal government. Most works that examine and discus
railroads in World War II appear to be in agreement that the limited government control was
responsible for the overwhelmingly positive conduct of American railways during the war
effort.'
With regards to railroads and regulation there are two most influential camps, those who
believe that the railroads needed to be regulated and those who felt that the railroads did not need
regulation, These two groups approach the same topic from different angles. Those such as Paul
W. MacAvoy and James Sloss, Regulation of Transportation Innovation 1967, found that in
some cases regulation of railroads by government organizations made it harder for railroads to
make a profit, especially with regards to their studied topic of coal transportation.

Their

conclusion that the government's one size fits all approach was to the detriment of certain
Patrick O'Brien The New Economic History of the Railways, (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1977);
Dick Roberts American Railroads: The Case/or Nationalization, (New York: Pathfinder Press,
1980)
2 John Westwood, Railways at War, (San Diego: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1980);S. Kipp
Farrington Railroads at War, (New York: Coward-McCann ,1944)

Niemann 5

railroads while others were not effected as much or at all shows that government regulation does
not always take into consideration all of the operators and all of their different unique
circumstances.

The other group's approach is split into two smaller groups, one that felt that

railroads needed to be regulated in order to prevent dire consequences in the form of unfair or
even non-competition and another group that felt that the railroads actually benefited from the
government efforts to regulate them. Authors such as Jack High, Regulation: Economic Theory
and History (1991), argue that certain railroads benefited greatly from government attempts to
regulate the industry. The two ways of looking at the topic of regulation seem to be equally split
with some supporting the approach that regulation hurt the railroads and some supporting the
idea that regulation was necessary even maybe beneficial to the railroads.'
The last category of writings regarding American railroads during the Second World War
has a very limited amount of academic level quality work. Most notable are John Westwood's
Railways at War (1980) and S. Kipp Farrington's Railroads at War (1944). Both ofthese works
take a very positive view of the American railroads during periods of war. In both works the
efforts of American railroads are seen as paramount to the success of the war efforts, particularly
with regards to the efforts of the Union during the Civil War which is regarded as one of the
reasons that the Northern war effort was more successful than the Southern one, Union railways
were better equipped and standardized."
In order to make an assessment of the extent of the government involvement in railroad
affairs in World War II this paper makes use of the available transcripts of government meetings
Paul W. MacAvoy and James Sloss, Regulation of Transportation Innovation (New York:
Random House 1967); Jack High Regulation: Economic Theory and History (University of

3

Michigan Press, 1991)
John Westwood, Railways at War, (San Diego: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1980);S. Kipp
Farrington Railroads at War, (New York: Coward-McCann, 1944)

4
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convened regarding the railroads from the period 1920 to 1950. A focus is placed on documents
that directly regard how much and in what ways the government should attempt to regulate the
railroads. These documents are the records of government meetings concerning legislation
passed that affect the railroads and demonstrate how the government went about determining the
validity of claims of unfairness by the various parties affected by the passage of the laws and
regulations.

These documents provided a wealth of information on how the government enacted

controls during the war and before the war and how the process of review of these laws was
carried out. The level of insight that the documents provide is vital to the understanding of what
were the limits of the government involvement and the documents also illustrate how the
congress went about determining if a particular area of government control needed to be
expanded upon or if it needed to be tapered.

Railroads in the First World War

The US became involved in the First World War in 1917. With this entry into war the
US mobilized for a truly modem industrial war for the first time. While America had prior
experience with operating railroads during a war in the American Civil War, the war effort in the
First World War required a far larger coordination of railroads across the whole nation moving
resources from all parts of the US to the important ports of embarkation towards Europe as well
as moving vital war material to all points. It was an experience that was new to America and
prior precedents were not so easily applied to the situation that faced the country in the First
World War.
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The organization of the railroad at this time was both highly competitive and incredibly
diverse. Most major cities were serviced by multiple railroads and major hubs, such as Chicago,
could have dozens of railroads operating within its limits. These railroads more often or not
provided both passenger and freight service to the areas that they serviced which resulted in a
number of redundant trains moving between the same towns simply because one railroad was
attempting to compete with another. This intense competition not only created a number of
redundancies in America's rail network but also meant that there was very little cooperation
between rival railroads beyond simple transfer procedures moving freight from one location to
another.'
The US government was largely apprehensive about allowing the railroads to operate
independently of each other during a time of national emergency. America was pitted against a
foreign power in a truly industrial war against an opponent who was equally industrialized and
fully mobilized for the war effort for the first time. The railroads were still independent of each
other as America entered the war properly in 1917. The railroad infrastructure had suffered from
the effects of decreased investment and decreased revenues due to the shipping rate caps that had
been imposed on the railroads. The railroads were trying their best to handle the war effort but
because of the lack of coordination and preparation they were unable to swiftly shift to a wartime
footing.
Fears of rivalries or fights over the movement of goods and of peace time activities such
as multiple trains scheduled to move between the same towns during a similar period of time

SRailroad revenues and expenses. Extractsfrom hearings. Statements of Walker D. Hines; E. J.
Manion; Wm. G. McAdoo; H J. Chapman; J. F. Anderson; Henry T. Hunt; J. J. Forrester, CISNO: S3430, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate Commerce. Senate, DOC-TYPE: Committee
Prints, DATE: 1922, SESSION-DATE: 1921, 1922, SUDOC: Y4Jn8/3:R13/35-6, Congressional
Indexes, 1789-1969
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prompted the US Government to seize full control over the major operations end of the railroads
for the duration of the war effort under the control of the United States Railroad Administration
(USRA). This institution was not created or planed before the war effort but was instead created
by President Woodrow Wilson in December of 1917 to address the issues of inter-railroad
cooperation and also to ensure that the railroads simultaneously modernized their fleets of
locomotives and facilities while also not taking advantage of the wartime situation to rise prices.
The distribution of facilities necessary for the operation of a transcontinental supply system,
mostly concentrated on lines owned by the larger railroads, also was grounds for the US
Government to seize control of the railroads in the national interest to insure that goods could be
effectively moved and locomotives and equipment properly maintained regardless of the owning
railroads capability to do so. The USRA essentially nationalized the American railroads for the
duration of the war. The railroads still managed day to day operations and still maintained their
executives but the scheduling, purchasing, and routing was largely placed into the hands of
government appointed overseers.

6

The USRA officials placed in charge of the operations of the railroads put an end to a
number of practices that were part of the nature of the competition between railroads in peace
time. Aspects of competition such as trains running the same route across different railroads
were changed in favor of a smaller number of trains that were better filled to capacity without
taking any regards to the owner of the train that was making the run under the control of the
government officials. The railroads had, for the most part, any form of formal competition
between them ended for the duration of the war and the post war demobilization process. On

6

Westwood. Railways at War. 78-83.
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paper they were still separate entities, yet they were managed by the USRA as one. The nature
of the railroads as profit seeking entities was likewise put on hold for the length of government
control. The railroads were required to use their existing wealth and the wealth earned during
7

the war to make the purchases outlined by the government officials.

One of the biggest problems that the USRA management of railroads during World War I
created was the lack of keeping in mind that each of the railroads were still fundamentally a
business in their own right. The USRA lacked the incentive to maximize each individual
railroads profit in favor of running the system as one large network. This approach towards
running the railroads resulted in the USRA taking steps such as moving freight over the shortest
distances. While this may seem to be logical when taking the larger war effort into
consideration, it can cause situations were a particular railroads right-of-way is used far more
than it was originally intended to because of all of the additional traffic sent over it.

8

One of the results of the government being put in control of the railroads during World
War I was the creation of a government board with in the USRA to create a standardized set of
locomotives and railcars to be built for the railroads, what has come to be known as the USRA
standard. This USRA standard sought to provide locomotives in the numbers necessary to
support the increase in the demand of shipping by the war effort. Most railroads lacked the
shops and construction knowhow to build their own locomotives, they could maintain them, but
lacked the capabilities to outright build them. The railroads instead relied on placing orders with
the major manufactures (the big three being Baldwin Locomotive Works, American Locomotive
Company, and Lima Locomotive Works) either based on specifications that they placed or

7

Westwood. 78-83.

8

Stover, American Railroads 167-191.
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picking from a variety of locomotives that they builder had previously commissioned for other
railroads. The US Government seized creative control of the new locomotive construction
process and commissioned a series of standard locomotives, known as the USRA standard
locomotives, that would be universally produced by all of the large manufacturers.

These

locomotives primary goal was to provide railroads with desperately needed modem locomotives
that were necessary to move the huge volumes of material that was tied to the war effort. The
locomotives, being conveniently standardized, were to also be easy to repair because of
universally uniform parts from one railroad to another. These requirements may have been in the
best interest of the country, but often left railroads with locomotives that may have been illsuited to the tasks that they were needed for or to the terrain that they were destined to operate
on. The government may have been able to meet its immediate needs but the railroads were
ultimately left with the bill for the locomotives and a good many executives were unhappy with
the resulting locomotives.

The specifications that were deemed to be sufficient for the

government purposes may have suited some railroads just fine. However, the same locomotive
could be vastly more powerful than a small operator may have required or not powerful enough
or incapable of making it over the large distances between refueling stations for another. The
one size fits all approach made it easy for the government to design and coordinate the
maintenance of these war locomotives at the cost of potentially being inconvenient to the railroad
that was stuck purchasing the resulting locomotive whether they actually wanted it or not."

9

Westwood. Railways at War. 78-83, and Stover, 167-191.
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Image 1: Photograph of a 2-10-2 steam locomotive designed by the USRA and put into mass
production by the USRA to meet the increased demand for traffic in World War I.

Source: 1922 Locomotive Cyclopedia of American Practice. New York: Simmons-Boardman,
1922.

Another aspect of establishing control of the railroads and the production oflocomotives
was the USRA immediately distributed any locomotives that the major builders had awaiting
sale in order to streamline the entrance into the war. The major builders did have a stockpile of
locomotives that they had on hand for any railroad looking to purchase them. With the dawn of
the USRA control of the railroads, these locomotives were requisitioned by the USRA for the
purpose of placing it in the service of a railroad that needed the extra motive power due to the
increased demand of the war effort. This redistribution demonstrates how the USRA operated
under the presumption of meeting the increased demand for rail traffic.
The focus on the transportation of war material rather than the profit in the end had a
negative impact on the railroads that had to foot the bill in most cases ultimately and many had
complaints of mismanagement or neglect in particular areas. The railroads successfully managed
to win $204,000,000 on top ofthe $900,000,000 paid by the government to cover the lost
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revenue that occurred during the period ofUSRA control, January 1, 1918 to March 1, 1920.
The $900.000.000 was the amount short that the railroads were after subtracting the revenue that
they took in during the period of USRA control from the total costs for maintenance, fuel, wages,
and other expenses. The railroads also had to pay for the new equipment that had been
purchased for the war effort. The new locomotives and rolling stock, fright cars and passenger
cars, that were purchased to handle the vast increases in traffic due to the war effort were all
eventually paid for by the railroads, even when the additional equipment proved to be far more
than was necessary to move goods during peace time. This extra equipment became unnecessary
when the total demand for rail traffic decreased and much of it was underused or placed into a
pool of backup locomotives that the railroads kept rather than active service. These additional
costs to the railroads were the result of the USRA prioritizing the movement of war material over
the sustainability of the railroads over time as an industry.

10

One major criticism that is leveled against the handling ofthe war effort during the First
World War by the United States Railroad Administration was that it moved far less material
while consuming similar amounts of fuel and slightly less man-hours than the American
railroads handled during the Second World War. This startling lack of efficiency for the
organization did not reveal itself until after the Second World War was underway. Both
economists, such as Thor Hultgren whose review of the railroads in World War II will be
reviewed latter, and historians, such as John Stover in his book American Railroads, remark on
this discrepancy.

The amount of tons moved per mile rose dramatically in the Second World

War while the amount of fuel consumed to move this material only increased by a small
percentage over that in World War I. While there was a significant increase in the number of

10

Stover, 167-191.
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man-hours used in the Second World War and technology had progressed creating larger more
efficient locomotives, these two factors do not account for the markedly smaller movement of
material in World War I. The way that the government managed the railroads under the USRA
is believed to be one of the major contributing factors of the discrepancy.

The interest that the

USRA held in moving the material was over the shortest routes and in the fastest manner
possible. Efficiency in categories beyond this, such as fuel efficiency, were not immediate
priorities of the USRA and were therefore neglected.

II

Post World War I Pre World War II Government Involvement in Railroad Affairs

The immediate reaction to the government intervention to the railroads was mostly
positive. The US Government had stepped in and seized control of a rail network that had
difficulties overcoming the competitive nature of the individual railroads and needed guidance.
The US government had stepped in and taken complete control of the nations rail network under
the aegis of the USRA. With the successful conclusion of the war in the favor of Allied forces
that the United States had joined, the war effort was regarded as a success. This positive attitude
that surrounded the USRA is demonstrated in the congressional documents relating to the
assessment of its performance after the war and demobilization process were both complete. The
general attitude of those recording the efforts of the USRA was that of success and triumph. The
agency had managed to coordinate the various American railroads together to successfully
carryout the war effort. The USRA had taken many steps to help improve the level of
Thor Hultgren, Railway Traffic Expansion and the use of Resources in World War II. (New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1944) 1-30, and Stover, 176-191.
11
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cooperation between the railroads during the duration of the war effort. However, these
improvements came at great cost to the railroads and often had little effect on the performance of
the railroads after the war.12
What was quite possibly the most damaging part of the way the USRA handled the
railroads during the First World War was the manner in which it addressed the railroads business
side. The USRA had allowed for multiple increases in pay to the various employee unions inside
of the railroads that when coupled with the rising cost of fuel and the low shipping rates that the
USRA enforced devastated the potential profits that the railroads could have made. The
railroads had suffered from a period of stagnation prior to World War I due to a downturn in
investment and increase in fuel and labor costs. The increased demand for higher paying jobs in
the defense industry caused unrest in those unions within the railroads that carried out similar
skill level jobs to those in the defense industry. The vast increase in traffic due to the war effort
could have provided the additional income that the railroads needed to reinvest in themselves.
The actions of the USRA limited the amount of money available to the railroads due to the
uptick in traffic during the war which cut the railroads out of additional funds which could have
further modernized the railroads by replacing obsolete locomotives and rolling stock, passenger
cars and freight cars, as well as updating other infrastructure such as communications and
signaling equipment as well as right-of-way and bridges .. 13

Railroad revenues and expenses. Extracts from hearings. Statements of Walker D. Hines; E. J
Manion; Wm. G. McAdoo; H J Chapman; J F Anderson; Henry T. Hunt; J J Forrester, CISNO: S3430, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate Commerce. Senate, DOC-TYPE: Committee
Prints, DATE: 1922, SESSION-DATE: 1921, 1922, SUDOC: Y4.In8/3:R13/35-6, Congressional
Indexes, 1789-1969
12

13

Stover, 167-191.
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The process of dismantling the USRA was the focus of the most strenuous involvement
of the US Government into the affairs of the railroads between the two wars. The majority of the
other legislation written during this period deals with various aspects of labor contracts, safety
standards. This type of legislation is not specific to the railroads industry. Many industries, the
steel industry for example, had very similar if not identical legislation passed in reference to
them. These types of laws exist as part of the nature workings of the economic system that is
practiced by the United States. These laws predominantly seek to prevent the railroads from
taking advantage of employees. These laws are only specific to the railroad industry because it
happens to be railroad employees who are concerned rather than employees of another industry,
this paper will not go too far in-depth to these regulations.

These laws generally deal with

increasing the hourly wage of employees across the industry and providing industry wide cost of
living raises that the railroads were reluctant to provide. As such, the railroads are here regulated
not because of the service they provided but instead they are regulated because they are a large

employer"

14 To Amend the Employers' Liability Act, CIS-NO: 75 H815-7, SOURCE: Committee on
Judiciary. House, DOC-TYPE: Published Hearing, DATE: July 7, 12, 14, 1937, SESSIONDATE: 1937, SUDOC: Y4.J89/1:Em7/13, Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969; National Safety
Standards Commission, CIS-NO: 75 S544-1, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate Commerce.
Senate, DOC-TYPE: Published Hearing, DATE: Apr. 27, 1937, SESSION-DATE: 1937,
SUDOC: Y4.In8/3:N21, Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969; Railroad Employment Protection,
CIS-NO: 74 H761-7, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. House, DOCTYPE: Published Hearing, DATE: Mar. 30, 31, Apr. 1,4, 1936, SESSION-DATE: 1936,
SUDOC: Y4.In8/4:RI3/38, Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969; Regulation of Interstate Motor
Carriers, CIS-NO: 74 H701-2, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
House, DOC-TYPE: Published Hearing, DATE: Feb. 19-22,26-28, Mar. 1,4,5, 1935,
SESSION-DATE: 1935, SUDOC: Y4.In8/4:M85/6, Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969;
Handling and Rate of Pay for Storage of Closed-Pouch Post Office Mail, CIS-NO: S279-12,
SOURCE: Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads. Senate, DOC-TYPE: Published Hearing,
DATE: June 7, 1926, SESSION-DATE: 1925, 1926, SUDOC: Y4.P8412:St7, Congressional

Indexes, 1789-1969.
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Another focus of the legislation of this period of time is anti-trust and fair competition
legislation. This is legislation that is designed to prevent either the railroads from working
together in an illegal fashion to artificially raise prices or to ensure the fair treatment of all
railroads so that no railroad takes dominance over the others by unfair business practices or
government aid. Again these laws are no different than those that concern other industries.
These laws only effect the railroads because these laws deal specifically with applying broader
practices of anti -trust legislation to the specific case of the railroads. These laws are part of the
normal legislative cycle and do not represent the government taking any steps beyond the
slandered legislative and regulatory practices of peace time. Both of these groups of laws are
overlooked by this work in favor of those that directly relate to steps that the government took to
effect changes in policy on the railroads as part of a conflict or similar event that required the
government to step into railroad affairs above and beyond the standard level of regulation during
peace time. IS

To Prohibit Discriminatory Practices in Granting of Transit Privileges, CIS-NO: 76 S613-19,
SOURCE: Committee on Interstate Commerce. Senate, DOC-TYPE: Published Hearing, DATE:
June 15, 19,20, 1939, SESSION-DATE: 1939, SUDOC: Y4.In8/3:T671, Congressional Indexes,
1789-1969; Preliminary report of study of railroad consolidations and unifications. By Wm. C.
Green, special counsel. Part 1, CIS-NO: S3434, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate Commerce.
Senate, DOC-TYPE: Committee Prints, DATE: 1931, SESSION-DATE: 1930, 1931, SUDOC:
Y4.In8/3 :RI3/46/pt.l, Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969; Preliminary report of study of
railroad consolidations and unifications. By Wm. C. Green, special counsel. Part 2, summary,
CIS-NO: S3435, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate Commerce. Senate, DOC-TYPE:
Committee Prints, DATE: 1931, SESSION-DATE: 1930, 1931, SUDOC: Y4.In8/3:R13/46/pt.2,
Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969; Report on the regulation of stock ownership in railroads.
Extractfrom HR. 2789 "Report on Regulation of Stock Ownership in Railroads", CIS-NO:
H2713, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. House, DOC-TYPE:
Committee Prints, DATE: 1931, SESSION-DATE: 1930, 1931, SUDOC: Y4.In8/4:R13/32,
Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969; Long-and-Short-Haul Charges, CIS-NO: 75 S560-0,
SOURCE: Committee on Interstate Commerce. Senate, DOC-TYPE: Published Hearing, DATE:
Feb. 24, Apr. 12, 1938, SESSION-DATE: 1938, SUDOC: Y4.In8/3:L8517, Congressional
Indexes, 1789-1969; Train Lengths, CIS-NO: 75 H820-2, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate
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It was not until the threat of imminent war that the US began to take measures to ensure
the cooperation of the railroads by the establishment of a Transportation Commission as part of
the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. President Franklin D. Roosevelt
appointed Ralph Budd as the Transportation Commissioner in charge of the new created
commission and went about actions to ensure the cooperation and consultation of the railroads in
matters of government control and regulation of railroads. Budd was a former president of the
Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad who was famous for revitalizing the railroad so it
could compete with bus and air transportation by introducing the all streamlined diesel "Zephyr"
as well as ensuring the company was still a viable provider of freight transportation against the
growing trucking and pipeline companies as well as other railroads. This position would be
shifted to a new agency and Budd became the Director of the Transportation Division in the
Office of Emergency Management.

Through groups such as this the US prepared of the

possibility of conflict by establishing the grounds to which the government would control or not
control particular aspects of the war economy. These advisory positions helped the US
government to come up with acceptable ways to handle the massive increase in freight and
passenger traffic without seizing direct control of the railroads.

28, Feb. 1-4,8-10, 15-18, Mar. 1-4, 17, 18, 1938, SESSION-DATE: 1938, SUDOC:
Y4.1n8/4:T68/4, Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969; Train Lengths. Supplement, CIS-NO: 75
H822-9, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. House, DOC-TYPE:
Published Hearing, DATE: 1938, SESSION-DATE: 1938, SUDOC: Y4.1n8/4:T68/4/supp,
Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969; Taking the Profits Out of War, CIS-NO: 75 H791-13,
SOURCE: Committee on Military Affairs. House, DOC-TYPE: Published Hearing, DATE: Jan.
26,28, Feb. 4, 9,10,23, Mar. 4, 22,1937, SESSION-DATE: 1937, SUDOC: Y4.M59/1:W19/8,
Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969.
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Railroads and Government Regulation in the Second World War

As America began to seriously step up its programs for rearmament and modernizing its
arsenal, laws regarding American railroads became more substantial and authoritative in nature.
This in its self is a not illogical progression, as America moved closer to becoming involved in
the conflict in Europe it necessitated actions to be taken that would allow for a smooth transition
into a wartime footing. As the threat of war loomed on the horizon, America took steps to ensure
such a smooth transition from peacetime operations to a wartime footing. A smooth transition
which allowed the country to enter the war without having to pause while the transportation
industry caught up with the demands of the war time increase in shipping was the desired
outcome. The opposite result, a period where the strategic resources necessary to wage war
being tied up across the country with no way to ship them, could have possibly set the war effort
and as a result dramatically weaken Americas ability to defend itself and its territories.
The US Government worked quickly to establish the various agencies required for the
management of the multiple aspects of the war effort. Committees were created for the purpose
of requisitioning the necessary property and material needed to set up the additional required
marshaling yards and laying the tracks needed to connect newly established or vastly expanded
arsenals. The Office of Emergency Management which had been established by President
Roosevelt in the lead up to the war had its Transportation Division placed into a position where it
could both make sound suggestions to the railroads and be receptive to the response that the
railroads had to the proposed and enacted policies that the government officials put in charge of
regulating the railroads for the duration of the Second World War created. The Transportation
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Division was headed by Ralph Budd, a former president of the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy
railroad.

16

One of the pressing aspects of the US in the opening acts of the war was the
establishment rail networks in locations vital to the war effort. In locations such as munitions
plants and the larger arsenals that were established to link multiple plants that are used in the
same line of production there was an insufficient amount of rail. These areas either lacked a rail
network prior to the war entirely, such as the munitions plants, or had a system of tracks and
yards that were not up to the task of the massive increase in shipping due to the war effort, such
as the ports. These areas often required many miles of track to be laid in order to connect the
distant parts of the munitions plants or establish proper rail yards for shipping purposes. The
need for vast amounts of tracks to meet the requirements to connect the areas that were newly
vital was complicated by the wartime scarcity of metal. The vital role that iron played in the war
effort required it to be rationed so as to ensure those directly involved in the creation of weapons
of war had the resource in amounts necessary to fulfill their quotas. The result was that while the
effort to connect these crucial war time industries and shipping facilities was a priority, it was
subordinate to the greater war effort. Thus the US Government sought alternatives to
requisitioning new rails for these purposes. This is where the government sought the cooperation
of the railroads.

17

The US Government established a commission to locate unused track to be repurposed
for these newly important operations. The commission was tasked to locate track that could be
16
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Requisitioning of Railroad Property, CIS-NO: 77 S705-8, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate
Commerce. Senate, DOC-TYPE: Published Hearing, DATE: Oct. 6-9, Dec. 2, 3, 5, 1942,
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tom up and then re-laid at points where it was required for a successful war effort. Abandoned
mining and logging operations were cataloged and investigated for the possibilities of acquiring
track to be moved to new locations. Similarly, the commission sought out unused or redundant
mainline right-of-ways for the purpose of harvesting track for the factories and ports. The
commission targeted the abandoned sources such as the mines and logging camps first for
sources of track because they were sources of material that were not going to be missed by their
owners because, for any of a variety of reasons such as the mine dried up or the Great
Depression caused the operation to become no longer viable. The government simply purchased
the unused rail segments from the owners at scrap price. 18
This particular technique represents a very unobtrusive form of government intervention
into the affairs of railroads. Here the individuals in charge of deciding the US Government's
policy towards railroads decided that, rather than seize control over all railroads and then decide
what track they wanted, the government officials surveyed the tracks that were least used and
then did an assessment of the line to be tom up to see if its loss would affect anyone. This level
of government involvement reflects a certain amount of restraint on the part of the regulators and
a higher level of respect to the individual railroads independence.

18
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Image 2: Portion of a United States Geological Survey map focusing in on the south-eastern
portion of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal
Source: U.S. Department of the Interior, US. Geological Survey. (Reston, VA, 1995)

While this allowed the government to reallocate a reasonable amount of material via the
outright unused track segments, it fell significantly short of the amount required to meet the
levels necessary to complete even a reasonable amount of projects. So the government officials
in charge of procurement decided to call on the railroads to help make up the deficit. The
government required the railroads to give up (statistic) of the track that they tore out and replaced
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as part of normal maintenance in order to provide rails for the various project. As part of the
deal the railroads still received fresh rails for the track that they were replacing and the railroads
were able to decide which rails they sent to the government operation to lay track in vital areas.
This requirement and the caveat that the railroads could choose the track that they sent to the
government reflects the nature of the government official's desire to guide the railroad industry
down the right path regarding the war effort without directly seizing control of it. 20
The amount of track from tearing up abandoned industrial track and acquiring the track
tom out as it was being replaced still was short of what the government deemed necessary for the
war effort and the government officials put in charge of procurement decided that they should
seek additional sources of rail. With the need for rail in those sectors most crucial to the war
effort continuing, the board in charge of requisition took one further step to try and acquire the
rail necessary with the cooperation of railroads. The government board began to investigate
cases of redundant mainline track, such as two railroads building right-of-ways near to each
other and neither being used to their full potential, and cases where railroads had abandoned a
spur and had failed to reclaim the rails, such as to a town that no longer had demand for rail
services or a section of track that lead to a factory or other industry that went under. In these
cases the rail was not actively being used or being used in a manner that was redundant, such as
in the cases of the parallel rail lines that serviced the same communities, so the government
officials saw themselves less as forcibly requisitioning material that was vital."
Another case where the government showed an interest in allowing the railroads
autonomy in operation while trying to enact controls to help the war effort is in the case of a
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shortage of freight cars. The railroads entered the war effort with the resources they had on hand
at the beginning of the conflict. As a result, the railroads were using mostly outdated equipment
that had not always been maintained more than was necessary to safely move products. The
Great Depression signaled a decline in demand for shipping, and so the railroads did not invest in
new freight cars while they still had operational cars. With no real incentive to invest in their
fleet of cars, the railroads maintained what they had and only built new cars to replace those
which had become damaged beyond repair. These two factors combined to result in a shortage
22

of freight cars when the war created a massive demand for them.

The massive increase in the demand for shipping goods by rail caused the railroads to be
caught in a paradox. They needed to provide additional cars for the purpose of shipping yet had
problems requisitioning the material needed to construct such cars because of the vital nature of
steel in the production of war goods. The increase in demand also put additional strain on the
existing cars, wearing out in short order cars that had been only given the most basic of
maintenance to keep them running. These two factors resulted in a dire set of circumstances
when the railroads had to manage the existing resources to their greatest extent. 23

Shortage of Railroad Equipment for Transportation Purposes [Part 1J, CIS-NO: 78 S736-5A, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate Commerce. Senate, DOC-TYPE: Published
Hearing, DATE: Nov. 8,9,1943, SESSION-DATE: 1943, SUDOC:
Y4.1n8/3:R13/64/pt.l, Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969. and Shortage of Railroad Equipment
for Transportation Purposes. [Part 2J, CIS-NO: 78 S736-5-B, SOURCE: Committee on
Interstate Commerce. Senate, DOC-TYPE: Published Hearing, DATE: Nov. 4-6, Dec. 23, 1943,
Jan, 5, 13, 15, 17, 18, Feb. 7, 1944, SESSION-DATE: 1943; 1944, SUDOC:
Y4.1n8/3:R13/64/pt.2, Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969, 1-521.
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The system that guided the use of railcars was largely left to the railroads for non-war
critical uses. The government allowed the railroads to continue with pre-war practices regarding
the distribution of cars beyond those industries that were central to the war effort. American
railroads appeared to have kept to a system of allocating cars to locations on a basis of
availability of cars, the priority nature of a shipment and the past use of freight cars by the
customer. The railroads also took actions to stockpile cars in response to seasonal demand such
as the movement of grain at harvest time. However, the strain on the system proved to be too
much and the railroads fell short of moving the required loads of grain in the fall of 1943. The
lack of the cars necessary to empty grain silos that in many cases still held the remainders of the
previous two years crops in parts of the northern Midwest resulted in a crisis, as there was no
room to store freshly harvested grain. The process was further complicated by the decisions of
several railroads to provide cars for the transport of grain intended for use as animal feed while
perfectly good grain was in danger of spoiling due to a lack of storage capacity coupled with an
abnormally large harvest. This issue of harvested grain on the ground potentially being ruined
because of a lack of cars available to transport it brought the issue to a head and to the attention
of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. The committee considered the many
different reasons for the crisis and also reviewed and critiqued the railroads on their policies
regarding the distribution of freight cars across the country and even on a local level. 24
While the government had little that they could do to solve the problem in the short run
with regards to the shortage of freight cars beyond launching an investigation into how the
railroads managed their supply freight cars, it did solve the larger problem by commissioning
several companies to produce war emergency box cars to meet the demand. This approach does

24

Shortage of Railroad Equipment, 1-521.

Niemann 25
have echoes of the USRA control of the First World War but it was handled differently in a
different set of circumstances.

Instead of producing a set of freight cars and forcing the railroads

to purchase them to meet demand the government officials elected to contract a group of
companies to produce the cars and then let the railroads buy up the freight cars on their own
volition. This resulted in those railroads that needed the cars to make purchases that benefited
their company not only in the short run but also thinking ahead to replace cars that had be
As the war progressed the American government began to review the effects of its
policies. The idea behind such reviews was to discern whether the approach that the US had
taken towards the railroads was successful beyond simply getting the job done. With this
purpose in mind American economists weighed in on the successes or failure of the US policies
up to that point. One such review of the American war time policy was the review of the policy
by Thor Hultgren for the National Bureau of Economic Research Railway Traffic Expansion and
Use o/Resources

in World War II, published in February 1944.25

Railway Traffic Expansion and Use

0/ Resources

in World War II was written by Thor

Hultgren, an American economist who specialized in transportation.

Hultgren (1903-1975) was

a major contributor to the National Bureau of Economic Research. While his highest degree was
a M.B. from the Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government although it is likely
he would have completed his doctorate had the school not folded. His colleagues noted that
while he lacked a doctorate he showed a dedication and level of self discipline that indicated he
was operating at that level of academic understanding.

Prior to his work at the National Bureau

of Economic Research, Hultgren worked with the government as an agricultural economist for
eight years and as an economic analyst with the Interstate Commerce Commission for four years.

25Hultgren, Railway Traffic Expansion and the use o/Resources in World War II, 1-30.
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This period with the Interstate Commerce Commission had a major influence on his latter work
with the National Bureau of Economic Research of which Railway Traffic Expansion and Use of
Resources in World War II is a part of. This work accesses the American railroads performance
during the period 1941 to early 1944 while taking into consideration the effects of US
government policy. Hultgren compares the increase in traffic to the prewar traffic levels to
demonstrate how far the railroads progressed and how well they had adapted to the tremendous
increase in traffic due to the war effort. This review is unique in that it took place during the war
itself as a self checking procedure to see if the policies enacted were working out. The review
approaches the subject from the perspective of his training, economics."
Hultgren observed the adaptation of the American railroads to a war time footing by
looking at the statistical data gathered by the government. This collected data was then used to
calculate among many things the efficiency of the American railroads during the war effort to
their efficiency prior to the war, in the Great Depression. The conclusions reached by the paper
included that the railroads saw a huge increase in efficiency in the war years, which was in part
by targeted reforms by the government. American railroads saw vast increases in the amount of
freight and passenger tonnage moved which is especially interesting when it is taken into account
that the amount of fuel used to move the vast increase in traffic saw only a slight increase. The
result was a quite significant increase in the efficiency of the railroads during the war. One of
the reasons that this increase in tones of freight and passengers moved for the amount of fuel
consumed was so significant was that the railroads had been running trains that were either not
filled to their capacity or were far less than the engine leading them was designed to pull. Both

Manuel Gottlieb. In Memoriam: Thor Hultgren, 1903-75. American Journal of Economics and
Sociology, Inc. Vol. 35, No.3 (Jul., 1976), pp. 335-336, and Hultgren, Railway Traffic
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of these situations were a result of having to move time sensitive goods, such as passengers or
perishable products such as milk or fish or fresh fruit, despite a decrease in the demand for all of
these goods and services because of the ongoing Great Depression. Railroads still needed to
move people and goods from place to place despite the decrease in demand for travel and goods
due to the downtick in demand that was caused be the Great Depression because they would face
bankruptcy if they did not provided services to those who still sought them. Thus, the American
railroads had accepted the cost of inefficiency during the Great Depression while still managing
to maintain their survival?7
Hultgren's review also demonstrates the US policy regarding the railroads. Among the
policies that the US government enacted was a review of the process of loading freight cars. The
US Government observed that the railroads were moving freight cars, particularly box cars,
without filling them to capacity. The government officials intervened in what they felt was a
wasteful practice due to the war. The war effort brought with it a vast increase in the amount of
traffic moved via all means of transportation, railroads were no exception. The increase in
demand for the movement of goods left the railroads to adapt to the situation, however the
government officials involved in the regulation of interstate transportation felt that the railroads
needed to adapt to the situation more quickly. The railroads were still operating like they had
during the Great Depression, moving cars as a group when the train was ready or moving the car
to a location and picking it up when the client requested it rather than seeking to maximize the
amount moved by the individual cars. Due to the vital nature of the war effort and evidence that
the railroads were not seeking to make the changes on their own, the government stepped in to
see that the railroads made the best use of the limited supply of cars. The railroads did not

27Hultgren, 1-30.

initiate these reforms on their own because it was not necessarily directly in the railroads interest
to maximize the amount carried by the car because of the way that the railroads billed the transit
of goods. The railroads used a system to calculate the shipping cost of a freight car based around
how much the cargo being moved weighed and how far it was going to be shipped. This system
had no incentive to maximize the cargo shipped per car on the part of the railroads; all incentive
was placed on the business being serviced. If the business was willing to ship cars less than full
than the railroads were willing to move the car. The government stepped in by setting goals for
how full a freight car must be before it is shipped. The result of the government's action with
regards to the loading of freight cars was that cars were required to be a certain percentage filled
or meet a particular number of tones in order to be allowed to be shipped with the use of mostly
self regulation and limited government observation. This use of government power to cause the
railroads to take an action that they would not normally do for the greater good of the war effort
is a prime example of the US policy towards railroads during World War

11.28

Another contrast between the First World War and World War II was that the railroads
remained independent in the category of design. The only restriction that was placed on the
railroads in the area of procurement of locomotive power was the construction of new diesel
electric locomotives.

This one notable example was driven by the war efforts requirement for

the tools that were needed to build diesel motors for trains were the often needed elsewhere for
the construction of war machines. The matter of rationing the few diesel locomotives that were
allowed to be produced was addressed by the government by a system of allocating the
locomotives to where they were to be needed most and thus to the railroads that were servicing
those regions. Thus railroads that found themselves moving material over these expanses were

28

Hultgren, 1-30.

Niemann 29

awarded the ability to procure additional diesel locomotives while those who did not had to make
do with purchases of traditional steam locomotives.
The freedom afforded to railroads in the field of the acquisition of new locomotives for
the war effort resulted in railroads being able to better fit their engine purposes to the needs of
their fleet. This independence allowed railroads such as the Santa Fe to purchase oil powered
locomotives that could carry enough fuel to make the trip from Chicago to Los Angeles without
refueling. The same independence allowed the Union Pacific railroad to construction more of its
articulated coal powered locomotives for the regions of Wyoming and Montana where more
typical non-articulated engines would have a hard time being both fast on the flat lands and still
have the power to move up mountain grades. This specialization of locomotives for the
purchaser that was not permitted in the First World War allowed the railroads to invest in
locomotives that could still be useful to the railroad after the huge demand for shipping decrease
post war. These purchases did not result in a surplus of locomotive power that did not quite suit
the railroads needs and instead allowed the railroads to maintain the type of locomotives that
they preferred for the jobs that they needed to carry out. Many of the locomotives purchased to
meet the increased demand brought on by the war found a decade or more of mainline service
after the war and preformed well at their jobs after the war because the railroad picked
locomotives that they knew that they would still need after the war was over.
The large articulated locomotives that the Union Pacific ordered during the war, with two
sets of pilot wheels followed by a first set of four driving wheels and then a second set of four
driving wheels topped off with a final pair of guide wheels under the cab a 4-8-8-4 wheel
arrangement, have been attributed by some within the Union Pacific railroad to having been one
of the reasons why there was not a major break down in transcontinental rail service during the
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war. These locomotives hauled incredible amounts of material across enormous stretches of
planes and prairies across the northern continental United States with impressive speed and
herculean strength and above all else, efficiency. The twenty-five purchased during the war in
addition to those which had been built before the war played a major role in assuring that the
Union Pacific was able to meet its transportation quota. These locomotives had originally been
ordered by the Union Pacific during the tail end of the Great Depression to better suit their
particular locomotive and power needs. The size and power of these locomotives was built to
the Union Pacific's specifications for a locomotive that could handle the steeper mountain grades
in the Rocky Mountains without needing the help of one or more additional helper locomotives
that required more time to cut into train before the grade and cut out again after the train made it
over the grade. They were also built to bum coal making use of a local available, abundant, and
therefore inexpensive resource in the Montana region. These locomotives went on to serve the
Union Pacific railroad until late July 1959. Even if the claim by the Union Pacific executives
may be exaggerated, it still conveys the importance of these engines to the success of the railroad
during the war effort and therefore the importance of allowing the railroads to make their own
choices in locomotives during a time of war. 29
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Image 3: A Union Pacific 4-8-8-4 "Big Boy", number 4007, being serviced by a female
turntable operator during the war.
Source: 4007, Big Boy and Centennial Collection, Union Pacific Museum, Council Bluffs, Iowa.

Even with the intense focus of the regulations and legislation on the nature of the war
effort, some of the traditional forms of government regulation of railroads and industry in
general did persist. The government still sought to enforce fair wages on the railroads. Similar
to the labor situation of the First World War, the armaments and steal industry both provided
high wages in these areas vital to the war effort. Again, like in the First World War, the various
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labor groups and unions that represented the railroads employees felt that they needed an
increase in the level of pay commensurate to that of the other vital industries. Trained and
untrained railroad employees were earning less than similarly trained personnel in other
industries and they wanted the railroads to correct this situation. The major unions threatened to
strike should the railroads not take measures to raise the wages of employees to a level
comparable with the other major industries involved in the war effort. The government stepped
in this time and created legislation to force the railroads to raise pay scales in order to fend off a
strike. 30
This action was not new to the Second World War, the government had taken similar
actions to raise pay to avert strikes in the First World War. This action is unique in that the
government had complete control over the operation of the railroads in the First World War via
the USRA. The Second World War required the government to carry out the same action via
slightly different means, not by direct control but instead via regulation. This change is not
incredibly important but is still significant because of the similar roll that the US Government
must play in ensuring that there is no work stoppage because of strikes during a time of national
emergency. The major difference between the two wars being that it World War II the US
Government played the role or arbitrator between the two groups rather than siding with the
workers outright as it did in the First World War to avoid a nasty labor dispute between itself, via
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the USRA, and the various labor unions that represented the employees of the railroads. This
example of the government maintaining its peacetime role as the protector of employees and the
group responsible for resolving labor disputes between unions and industry even during the
changed circumstances of the war shows that the US government did not totally shift away from
the more basic role that it provides because of the war. Instead, the government and the officials
that comprise it added to their existing regulatory roles, even if the existing regulatory roles were
somewhat neglected if they were not of dire urgency, such as the possibility of a workers strike
that could cause a nationwide transportation disastet"

Post World War II Railroad Regulation

The laws and regulations passed in the immediate aftermath of the war, 1946 to 1950,
were a return to the status quo. A number of laws and regulations that were put into effect for
the duration of the war slowly expired or ceased to be relevant as the war effort wrapped up in
1945. As the war effort concluded with the return of the troops and the program to disarm, the
railroads slowly returned to their prewar management policies and the government began to shift
back to the prewar regulation standards.
Similar to the period after the First World War, the government became more concerned
with the more mundane aspects of regulation after the end of the Second World War. With no
all consuming war controlling the attention of the country and by extension the countries
railroads, regulation shifted back to the type of regulation scene in the prewar years. This shift
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returned in a large part to the style and nature of legislation and regulation that dominated the
post World War I to World War II period with a few new additions and changes that reflect the
different nature of the two times societal norms. This return signaled the reestablishment of antitrust, labor negotiations, and safety standards to the priority of government legislation.
The return to the prewar standards demonstrated an increase in labor and workers rights
laws that had played a relatively minor roll compared to the requisition and coordination
regulations and laws that dominated the Second World War. These regulations once again
became a major part of the American regulatory scene. Once again, the government was looking
to seek to protect workers by establishing full compensation to those who retired from the
railroads after reaching a retirement age and having served a certain number of years of service,
such as thirty years working on various railroads. The government also made returns to trends in
pre war legislation that sought to protect the wages of workers in the rail industry in comparison
to other industries. Both of these areas and the broader scope of workers' rights reasserted itself
in the wake of the war. 32
The post war return to normalcy also ushered in a new round of anti-trust and oversight
of railroads. While the railroads needed to work together to achieve the goal of victory during
World War II, the government returned to assuring that the railroads did not engage in any sort
of coercion or price collusion. The post war legislation and regulations also saw a return to the
governments assurance that the railroads operated within the letter of the law andan attempt to
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assure that the railroads did not raise prices unnecessarily nor attempt to penalize customers who
needed to ship on multiple carriers to reach their destination. These laws similarly show that the
US Government returned to its prewar role of regulator and guardian of the public in the style
and content of the legislation and regulations passed in the period immediately after the Second
World War?3
Another aspect of legislation that again returned to its prewar norms was that of safety.
This was one. aspect that in particular suffered during the war years. The US Government had
allowed the railroads to fall below the minimum number of inspections and safety standards for
the duration of the war in order to ensure the steady and timely delivery of vital war material. As
a result, many railroads had let track inspections and locomotive maintenance slip as low as
possible during the war effort in order to keep costs and time consumed carrying out these
matters of routine maintenance to a minimum to ensure the maximum amount of material was
moved. With the urgency of the war past, the government returned to the prewar standards of
safety and accountability and then elaborated on it. The US Government continued the tread to
step of safety standards and practices while also increasing the level of accountability that the
railroads were held to in matters of employee injury. This return to making safety a priority of
the government policy shows how the government adapted its policy during the war in favor of
speed and volume over safety back to the prewar trend to increase safety standards. The post
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Committee on Rules. House, DOC-TYPE: House Unpublished Hearings Collection, DATE: July
3,1947, SESSION-DATE: 1947, Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969; and Charges Between
Carriers, CIS-NO: 80 HInt-T.37, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
House, DOC-TYPE: House Unpublished Hearings Collection, DATE: Mar. 3, 1947, SESSIONDATE: 1947, Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969;
33

Niemann 36
war years approach towards safety and accountability represent the return to the normal routine
of government oversight and control. 34

Conclusion

The US Government reacted to the perceived overstepping of its bounds in the First
World War when it seized direct control of the railroads by taking a more advisory role in the
Second World War. The Second World War revealed a US policy that targeted particular
essential areas and regulated the behavior of the railroads in these areas but allowed the railroads
to remain independent and capable of guiding their own fate. This action helped to lead to a
substantial increase in material moved while only increasing the amount of fuel used to move it
in comparison to the First World War. While the US government did expand the role of the
bureaucracy during the war years, this expansion was nowhere. near the extent of the expansion

34 Maintenance of Railroad Tracks, CIS-NO: 80 HInt- T.34, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce. House, DOC-TYPE: House Unpublished Hearings Collection, DATE:
Mar. 3, 1947, SESSION-DATE: 1947, Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969; To Promote the
Safety and Health of Employees Engaged in Baggage, Mail, or Express Train Service in
Interstate Commerce by Requiring Common Carriers by Railroad and any Express Company To
Install and Maintain all such Cars and Equipment Used or Furnished by Them for such
Purposes in Safe and Suitable Conditions for Use in the Service for Which They Are Put, CISNO: 80 HInt-T.80, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. House, DOCTYPE: House Unpublished Hearings Collection, DATE: July 14, 1947, SESSION-DATE: 1947,
Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969; Railroad Locomotive Inspection, CIS-NO: 80 HInt- T.36,
SOURCE: Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. House, DOC-TYPE: House
Unpublished Hearings Collection, DATE: Mar. 3, 1947, SESSION-DATE: 1947, Congressional
Indexes, 1789-1969; Railroad Safety, CIS-NO: 81 HI253-6, SOURCE: Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce. House, DOC-TYPE: Published Hearing, DATE: May 17, 18, June 24,
1949, SESSION-DATE: 1949, SUDOC: Y4.1n8/4:R13/48, Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969;
and Railroad Safety (Communications Systemsfor Trains), CIS-NO: 81 S908-9, SOURCE:
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Senate, DOC-TYPE: Published Hearing,
DATE: May 19, June 14,23,24, July 6, 1949, SESSION-DATE: 1949, SUDOC:
Y4.1n8/3:R13/69, Congressional Indexes, 1789-1969.
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of power during World War I. The nature of this expansion was also different in that it sought to
leave the railroads in control of their assets and operations while still meeting the increased
demand and sensitivity of war time operations.
The study of the government regulation of railroads is important because of the ever
relevant controversy of how much control the government should take in the area of industrial
regulation. The case of the US Government involvement in the railroad industry during World
War II demonstrates a level of restraint in the invasiveness of the government into industry. This
vital middle ground that is demonstrated in this example is key to fmding the optimum mix of
regulation and freedom. Without the government measures to regulate the industry, the railroads
would have moved material at their own leisure. The railroads would have likely followed the
same profit motivated operating system that the used in peace time that gave priority to
shipments that paid more or were time sensitive, such as perishables. This system could have
left the government waiting for equipment to be moved from one place to another, stalling vital
troop and equipment movements overseas because the railroads choose to move a train of more
profitable goods over those that the government needed moved for the war effort. It also could
have greatly increased the cost of the war if the government tried to increase the value of is
shipments by paying more to ship them faster. The opposite is too much regulation as was
demonstrated by the role that the US Government took during World War I. The government
seizing complete control of the industry left the railroads on the losing end of a deal. The
railroads moved the government trains at the highest level of priority and charged what the
government felt was fair and disregarded the independent nature of the railroads as profit seeking
corporations.

The result of this effort was the job was done but at great cost the railroads in lost

revenue, additional unnecessary expenses, and purchases above. and beyond what the railroads
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needed in the long run in order to meet short term demands. This achieved the goal of moving
the freight and personnel required but at the cost the railroads missing out on the extra money
available during the war effort and also the surplus of equipment that needed to be dealt with.
The route in-between these two extremes was the approach that the US Government took
in the Second World War. By guiding the railroads to make the most out of every freight
shipment and prioritizing shipments vital to the war effort but while still operating in the same
overarching environment the material necessary to the war was still delivered in a timely
manner. Allowing the railroads to make purchasing decisions bounded by the constraints of the
war effort, the railroads managed to make purchases during the war that benefited the railroads
even after the war was over, not just during the short run. This route achieved the goals of the
government while allowing the railroads to benefit from the period of intense economic growth
rather than being a slave to it. It allowed the railroads to self impose co-operation on themselves
rather than be forced into compulsion by the government.

35

This level of regulation is especially important when it is viewed in the light of the New
Deal program of government involvement that had been advocated by President Roosevelt
before the war. The New Deal represents for a time when the US Government stepped up the
level of government involvement in the lives of Americans. The New Deal ushered in
revolutions in America such as Social Security and massive industrial and business reforms. It
created millions of government funded jobs to provide work for unemployed men and women.
All of this increased government involvement during the Great Depression can be seen as the
government overstepping its bounds or as a necessary step to alleviate the crisis of the largest
economic downturn in American history. When the low level of government control that is

35
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experienced by the railroads during World War II is viewed in this light it helps to break the
stereotypical view of the Roosevelt administration being regulatory overbearing.

This very same

level of antipathy directed towards the liberally minded Roosevelt administration plagues the
more liberal politicians and governments to this day. The case of the railroads shows an
extraordinary high level of flexibility on the part of the Roosevelt administration compared to the
more stringent methods used earlier in the very same administration with regards to the New
Deal. Thus this study of the regulation of railroads is significant today in both demonstrating
how industry and government can work together and both reach their goals and also showing that
the Roosevelt administration was not attempting to break down the level of autonomy that
private industry has. This work demonstrates that the forces of industry and those of government
can work together in a partnership without the government overstepping its bounds. Both the
American railroads and the US Government benefited from the war effort that was linked to
World War II. The railroads benefited from their independence and their ability to set their own
prices, within reason, and managed to modernize the railroads with new locomotives and rolling
stock after the years of the Great Depression that were void of any major investment.

This

modernization effort that coincided with the increase in traffic ensured that the railroads could
still provide services to a post depression America.
The importance and lasting significance of this paper is showing that the middle route
between total government control and total freedom on the side of industry is the best option.
The government should regulate as far as it is necessary to ensure the survival and safety of the
nation. The government should expect full corporate cooperation from American industry in a
time of crisis. However, in a peacetime situation or a circumstance that does not endanger the
lives or livelihood of American citizens, the government should provide more leniencies in how
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it creates legislation to regulate industry. Even today there is much discussion going on about
what steps the government should and should not take in order to ensure the safety and stability
of the nation. Recent events such as the US Government buying up parts of the major American
auto makers or providing loans to the hurting banking industry are just some actions that reflect
the continuing level of intervention that the US Government and the individuals that are
employees and officials inside of it take to ensure the safety and stability of American industry.
These recent government interventions had similar motivations behind them; these actions were
taken to prevent harm from coming to America and its citizens. While this harm was not from
an aggressor nation or military opponent, it still constituted a threat to the security and stability
of America and as such necessitated a government reaction in the eyes of some. This paper
address one example of how the government successfully made such interventions on the behalf
of the American citizens which ended with both the government and industry benefiting from the
results.
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